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Massari: Commentary on Nagan

COMMENTARY ON NAGAN
Toni M. Massaro*
Professor Nagan's central thesis - that the rules of civil procedure
have a power-affinity - is obvious in the way that gravity is, once
your attention is drawn to it. The power lawyers wield because they
are trained in the rules of civil procedure - "a science which is necessary, but which is not very generally known"1 - likewise is obvious.
The power aspect of procedure is so obvious that it often escapes the
attention of law students, legal educators, lawyers and judges.
Laypeople, however, seem acutely aware of the special power reserved
to legal practitioners. Their power disadvantage makes some nonlawyers resentful and suspicious of the jargon - the "game" lawyers
'2
play - "all at the expense of the Defendant.
Professor Nagan underscores the sharp contrast between the outsider's mistrust of lawyers' procedure and lawyers' near reverence for
it. He believes that we must reconsider procedure from an outsider's
perspective. His purpose is reform, but not reform in the limited,
traditional sense of amendments that, for example, restrict the number
of interrogatories a party can file. Rather, he advocates broad reform
inspired by a standard other than what he refers to as "immediate
practitioner relevancy."
Taking a wider, "observer's" view, Professor Nagan points out the
gaps between the Supreme Court's statements about procedural fairness3 and its actual practice in ensuring fairness. 4 A commentator who
adopts the "immediate practitioner relevancy" perspective does not
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DuMaurier describes a lawyer at work:
The Attorney-General spooned his witness bait, fed her with frivolous sop ....
The Court applauded. The Lord Chief Justice could not interrupt them. The pair
were playing a game that defied intervention, they were matched like reel and rod
and there was no unwinding. They juggled in jargon, dabbled in double entendres,
wallowed in each other's witticisms, and all at the expense of the Defendant.

TOCQUEVILLE,

DUMAURIER,

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

MARY ANNE

124 (Mentor Ed. 1956).

309 (1954).

3. For example, Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines the purpose of the
Rules as "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R.
CIV. P. 1.
4. See Nagan, Civil Process and Power: Thoughts from a Policy-OrientedPerspective, 39
U. FLA. L. REV. 453 (1987).
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notice or care about these gaps in the way Professor Nagan encourages
us to care.
The "immediate practitioner relevancy" standard, therefore, is
quite different from the "policy-perspective relevancy" standard Professor Nagan advocates. Under the practitioner relevancy standard,
a valid question is whether, for example, judicial enforcement of a
confession of judgment clause has a tendency to promote internal,
practice-dominated needs. It is not relevant whether the judicial practice can be squared with courts' statements about procedural fairness
in other contexts. Neither is it relevant whether these statements,
taken together, express desirable higher procedural values that actually are observed in practice. In other words, the "power" component
of procedural practice, as Professor Nagan describes it, is irrelevant
under much of the conventional way of critiquing procedure.
If we ask different questions about common procedural problems,
we of course find different answers. This is what Professor Nagan
encourages us to do. He wants us not only to notice that our procedure
choices are power/value choices but also to make those choices in a way
that better promotes wider policy ends. That is, we should take seriously our own rhetoric about securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, by defining these terms not from
our parochial insiders' view, or even from an individual client perspective, but from the broader, social policy perspective he promotes.
Professor Nagan's thesis may have wide-ranging practical implications. If we adopt his view, we not only must re-think "procedure"
in a jurisprudential sense, but we must also re-evaluate our methods
of teaching "procedure." Even if we do re-think our methods and alter
them to promote the ends Professor Nagan describes, we may effect
little change. A brief discussion of the work-product doctrine of civil
discovery illustrates this point.
Hickman v. Taylor5 and Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure6 prevent an opponent from discovering documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial without
a showing of "substantial need," "hardship" and "no substantial equivalent." If we adopt the "immediate practitioner relevancy" perspective, the work-product doctrine seems inevitable, sensible, and neces-

5. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Rule 26 provides that a party cannot discover an opponent's
work-product absent a showing that he or she "has substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of his [or her] case and that he [or she] is unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." Id.
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sary. First, we can and do label the doctrine "procedural." That is,
we claim that this rule is value neutral, and not one that changes
litigation results or affects what Justice Harlan in Hannav. Plumer7
called "primary decisions respecting human conduct."8
We can intone the conventional lore that, without the work-product
rule, lawyers would be "inefficient," "demoralized," and inclined to
engage in "sharp practices." We also can describe as a "parasite" the
plaintiffs lawyer who, in order to prepare for interviewing witnesses,
asks for oral and written statements from witnesses who already have
been interviewed by the defendant's lawyer; such a lawyer is either
"without wits" or seeks to borrow wits from the adversary.9 And, we
can view discovery - the information-gathering stage during which
most lawsuits are resolved - as inescapably adversarial. If law
educators adopt this practitioner perspective, they need only instruct
the students in the "how-to" aspects of work-product, and explain its
parochial, practice-based justifications.
The work-product doctrine, however, is not preordained, not
strictly procedural and not value-neutral.10 The work-product doctrine
is justified, it is said, by the adversary process. But, adversarial
discovery, versus adversarial trial, is not the only rational or necessarily the most effective information-gathering technique.
Although we label the work-product doctrine procedural, the doctrine, like privilege rules, can affect non-courtroom behavior - at
least for behavior of well-advised, "repeat performers" in civil litigation." Corporate counsel may advise clients to gather information in
ways that will improve their chances of successfully resisting future
motions to compel production of the information. Indeed, both the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product qualified immunity in
effect encourage clients to involve lawyers in daily operations, and
make clients dependent upon legal counsel not only for advice, but
also as a shield from intrusive discovery. It is sound business practice

7. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
S. Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).
9. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
10. See Waits, Work Product Protectionfor Witness Statements: Time for Abolition, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 305. Professor Waits makes the case against work-product qualified immunity
for witness statements in terms that are highly relevant to Professor Nagan's thesis that procedural rules are power rules. Waits points out the cost of immunity for witness statements,
id. at 319-24, and concludes that the benefits of the rule are conferred primarily upon institutional
litigants who are "repeat" performers in litigation. Id. at 325.
11. See id. at 325.
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to have a separate legal department, with its own letterhead. It is
sound business practice to "run things by the lawyers," to allow attorneys to spearhead investigations into accidents and to allow attorneys
to direct experts or agents involved in the investigation.12
Access to information during discovery affects the quality and nature of the evidence presented at trial, as well as decisions about
whether to settle a lawsuit and for what amount. Thus, discovery
rules can affect the outcome of litigation in very palpable ways.
Moreover, the primary arbiters of the limits of the work-product doctrine are not judges, but lawyers. Discovery disputes under the federal
rules are not resolved by judges unless lawyers are unable to settle
an issue among themselves. Most discovery requests are served and
heeded with no judicial approval or oversight. Indeed, the discovery
sanction rules 1 make it potentially costly for lawyers to request judicial
intervention in discovery disputes: the prevailing lawyer can request
that the loser pay the costs associated with the request.
The work-product rule is described as neutral because both parties
theoretically have equal access to the underlying facts and because
"dliscovery is a two-edged sword";14 that is, neither party can uncover
the other's work-product. The benefits of the rule, however, may not
be distributed equally. For example, a consumer who sues a corporation for physical injuries caused by the corporation's product cannot
discover the work-product of the company's lawyers, agents, or nontestifying experts. The consumer's lawyer operates at an information
disadvantage. Unlike the company's lawyer, the consumer's lawyer,
experts and researchers may not know where to begin the search for
information about the injury-producing product. The consumer, therefore, does not have "equal" access to the facts, given this greater time
and expense in finding those facts. Indeed, a guiding principle of
discovery is that if you do not ask the right question, you will not
get the right answer. Asking the right question, however, is a matter
of knowledge and experience. A dearth of either may disable even
the brightest attorney, at the consumer client's expense. Even if the
consumer's lawyer could uncover the same facts as the corporation's
lawyer, the work-product rule requires that both parties pay the expense of uncovering this data. This double expense is borne by the

12. Id. at 340-42.
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 26, 30, & 37.
14. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 515 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson observed
that plaintiffs' lawyers formed the chief opposition to broader discovery "because defendants
have made liberal use of it to force plaintiffs to disclose their cases in advance." Id.
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clients, to the obvious benefit of no one except, perhaps, the clients'
lawyers and agents.
How, then, do we justify the costs of the work-product rule? We
simply accept the assumption that without the rule, lawyers would be
demoralized, would engage in sharp practices, and would not write
anything down, thereby ultimately defeating the truth-seeking goal
of discovery. If we reject this assumption, then we may find it difficult
to square the rule with our stated desire to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action. In fact, however, very
little is known about how lawyers would act, if the work-product rule
were abandoned. Why, one might wonder, is there no significant call
to explore the rule's untested rationale?
One explanation may be that the rule is working reasonably well,
and consequently no great need dictates that we test the rationale.
Another explanation, suggested by much of what Professor Nagan
has said, is that the work-product rule works reasonably well to serve
lawyer ends, even though the individual client may be ill-served by
the doctrine. Moreover, no one besides lawyers knows if the rule
defeats larger policy goals: only lawyers have meaningful access to
this extra-judicial discovery process.
In medicine, the consumer may not know whether medical tests
are warranted. Only the medical professional can make that judgment.
Similarly, only a legal professional can make an informed judgment
about whether a deposition of a particular witness is needed. In
medicine, however, health insurers, medical review panels, or other
supervisory bodies may review a medical practitioner's decision to
order a series of blood tests. In contrast, no one oversees the legal
practitioner's discovery decisions. Despite their power-affinity, procedure rules are seen as the insider lawyer's exclusive province.
If, however, no outside force requires procedural rules to promote
the public ends Professor Nagan extols, then the changes he desires
are unlikely to occur. We must have incentive to change the rules or
at least to reexamine them. If practitioners are the only people who
see and use the rules, then it is no surprise that the rules reflect an
"immediate practitioner relevancy" perspective.
One "outside" force that might encourage practioners to consider
broader policy goals when using and construing the procedural rules
is legal education. A civil procedure teacher's choice of how to teach
a case like Hickman v. Taylor may play a role in how students later
behave as lawyers in the discovery stage of litigation. The professional
behavior rewarded in Hickman - "give nothing up willingly" - is
learned behavior. If this behavior is taught in law school without a
discussion of whether it promotes interests beyond the profession,
then it is doubtful that most graduates later will seriously consider
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the rule's value. On the contrary, they will likely regard as heresy
any argument against the conventional wisdom of Hickman. Yet, if
students view procedure as the "key to the business of lawyering,"
as Professor Nagan suggests, then legal educators must consider what
message is conveyed about that business when the plaintiffs lawyer
in Hickman is called a "parasite." What assumptions underlie a procedure system in which "borrowing wits" is regarded as a deeply
serious, even fatal, breach of the rules? How does that definition of
skill and triumph promote the stated objective of securing the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action?
Two problems - both practical in nature - suggest that change
may not occur even if legal educators do accept the view that procedural rules, like work-product, have a power affinity, and also accept
theoretical responsibility for training lawyers in a broader policy perspective. The first problem lies in the fact that most civil procedure
courses are five hour courses. This may translate to only eight hours
of class time spent on the discovery principles and methods. The
pedagogical dilemma - obviously not unique to civil procedure - is
how to cover the basic concepts and expose the students to the mechanics of discovery, yet also engage in serious, effective critique of discovery concepts, all within these eight hours. Professors can choose among
several alternatives:
1. Teach only the techniques, or "operational code."
2. Teach the techniques and the underlying assumption or "myth."
3. Teach the techniques and the assumption, but challenge the
assumption.
4. Refuse to teach the techniques and focus solely on the assumptions.
5. Teach new, less adversarial techniques and develop new assumptions.
6. Teach the techniques but refuse to lend force to them - not
unlike placing the lying client on the stand to testify, but refusing to
participate in the lie.
If professors choose not to expand the perspectives of their students - soon to become "insiders" - then the students may have
little incentive, or tools with which to challenge the legal rules that
are most foreign to lay people, most impervious to "outsider" input
and critique: procedural rules. Yet, procedure teachers have an obligation to train students to juggle effectively in jargon and to use the
prevailing "operational code" to their clients' advantage.
The second, more significant problem lies beyond legal education.
Even professors who ignore the obligation to train students in the
prevailing code and who focus solely on policies behind the rules may
effect little change. Once students leave law school, their discovery
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ethics likely conform less to professorial exhortations than to whatever
discovery practices their future law associates and partners follow.
Professor Nagan's thesis, therefore, is a disturbing one. The poweraffinity of the rules may be obvious, like gravity. But, it is difficult
to know what a legal educator can "do about it" if - as gravity proves
the apple will fall anyway.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 15

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss2/15

8

